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Learning Capacity as an Industry Capability
Kristina Setzekorn,
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Abstract:
Industrial learning (i.e., interorganizational creation, diffusion and management of information assets) is
portrayed as an industry capability which is differentially accessed by firms depending on their absorption
capacity and relative bargaining power, both of which are determined by their complementary resources.
IT enhances industrial learning by improving communication capabilities and optimizing incentive systems.
IT also enables individual firms' appropriation and exploitation of industrial learning to the extent that it
leverages complementary firm resources.

Introduction
According to the resource-based view, strategic advantage accrues from a firm's superior and inimitable
resources (including capabilities). This view is used to portray industrial learning (the interorganizational
creation, diffusion and management of information assets) as an industry capability that can be
differentially accessed by firms depending on their absorptive capacity and relative bargaining power.
Industry learning is conceptualized as having four dimensions: innovativeness, cooperation,
communication, and measurement precision.
Information asset creation, diffusion and management are industry capabilities that confer competitive
advantage to firms having more absorptive capacity and bargaining power resulting from their
complementary resources. (Foss & Eriksen, 1995) IT ubiquity contributes to industrial learning by
facilitating measurement precision and comparisons, by enabling collaborative innovation and the diffusion
and management of this innovation between individual workers and among firms in an industry. IT
enhances firms' competitiveness to the extent that it leverages their complementary resources, thereby
conferring superior absorptive capacity and bargaining power.
Breitschneider & Wittmer (1993) show that the rate at which a firm adopts micro computer technology
varies depending on the sector within which it operates. Bobrowski & Breitschneider (1994) attribute these
differential diffusion rates to an industry's inherent density of communication channel linkages and to the
cooperative interorganizational relationships that result.
Learning industries, i.e., those characterized by experimentation with diverse ideas and by rapid feedback
as to experimental results, seem to be the most innovative, most dynamic (Foss & Eriksen, 1995). Perhaps
learning firms that comprise them are more competitive. "The firm's competitive advantage rests with its
ability to 'out-learn competitors'" (Leonard-Barton, 1992:32, in Sitkin, et.al. , 1994:550). "A particularly
strong statement of this is Senge's (1990) comment that 'the only enduring source of competitive advantage
is the ability to learn' " (Levinthal, 1995:22). This dynamic diversity, this innovativeness, helps assure
effective positioning in an uncertain environment (Sitkin, Sutcliffe and Schroeder, 1994).
The next section presents such industry innovativeness as an enhancer of organizational efficiency and
effectiveness, to the extent that individual firms possess complementary resources, which determine firms'
absorptive capacity, as well as bargaining power in appropriating industry learning. The third section
considers communication and cooperation as components of industrial learning, and discusses their
facilitation by IT. The fourth section discusses measurement precision's contribution to innovativeness,
communication and cooperation.

Innovativeness
Perhaps learning industries are more efficient and more diverse. Following a "population ecology of ideas"
rationale, one can surmise that firms' selection of the fittest ideas from a maximally diverse and innovative

"industry idea pool" will evolve an industries to the most efficient, most effective technologies for given
environmental contingencies. An alternate analogy is Churchman, et.al.'s (1957) generic conceptualization
of "the problem" as being the difference between a problem-solver's wants and her environment's capacity
to provide for those wants. The problem solution then involves the evaluation and choice from among her
set of alternatives (Preston, 1991). The more diverse and complete the alternative set, the more optimal the
problem solution, given any environmental context.
Industrial learning can thus be construed as an industry capability, a network externality that improves an
individual member firm's competitiveness to the extent that the firm is able to exploit it to improve
efficiency, raise entry barriers and eventually appropriate rents from it (Foss & Eriksen, 1995). This
differential appropriation and exploitation depend on a firm's complementary resources, e.g., competence
of its R&D staff, competence of its management, its existing knowledge (tacit and explicit) base, its market
share, its history, its culture, its geography, its relationships, etc.
Industry learning capacity can also be seen as a liability, in that strategic advantage in this dynamic
environment is fleeting, as new and better ideas quickly dissipate across organization borders, and a firm
becomes unable to control its innovation. This diffusion allows competition, which soon shifts the
innovation from a strategic advantage to a "strategic necessity," as the innovator and its competitors bid
away the profits. Customers consequently appropriate most of the benefits. (Clemons & Row, 1991; Hitt
&Brynjolfsson, 1996) But, the diffusion of efficiency-enhancing innovation across firm borders to strategic
partners, or to otherwise benevolent firms in the value chain, may also enhance the entire value chain's
efficiency, and thus confer indirect benefits to the original innovative firm.
One could use the cooperative game theoretic concept of Shapley values when modeling how firms divide
among themselves this "shared good." A firm's Shapley value is the product of its probability of inclusion
in any given coalition and its contribution to each potential coalition. Firms having greater complementary
assets and capabilities are able to contribute more (compared to other industry members), and are thus more
likely to be included in coalitions and projects. They also have higher reservation points, or better
alternative uses for their capabilities and resources and will consequently wield more bargaining power as
measured by higher Shapley values. As they have more bargaining power and more "absorptive capacity",
these firms will be likely to also command a larger share of the industry's knowledge. Thus, one could
propose that these firms having more complementary assets (enhanced by IT) would be more efficient and
effective.

Communication and Cooperation
Communication and cooperative industry norms are synergistic as enablers of industrial learning, i.e.,
communication facilitates cooperation, which further improves communication, etc. IT ubiquity enhances
both. Gurbaxni and Whang (1991) say, "Modern IT . . . facilitates tighter interfirm links through
information sharing and mutual monitoring." Clemons and Row (1992) suggest that IT has the effect of
reducing the risk associated with the opportunism of a firm's trading partners, e.g., shirking, loss of
resource control, ex post contract renegotiation, etc. This is due to IT's supplying the means for improved
contract performance monitoring, for expedient payoff calculations, and its enablement of a firm's
organizational memory.
This risk decrease shifts a firm's temporal horizon from finite to infinite, as illustrated by the prisoners'
dilemma game. This device gets its name from the story: two conspirators were arrested and interrogated
separately. Each was offered a plea bargain: if he would implicate his partner, and his partner didn't
implicate him, he would go free, while his partner would spend ten years in prison. If he refused to
implicate his partner, and his partner implicated him, he would spend ten years in prison, while his partner
went free. If both refused to implicate the other, they would each serve one year in prison on trumped-up
charges, and if each "copped a plea", both would spend five years in prison. Therefore, the best strategy for
each to follow in a finite, i.e., one-shot game, is to fink on his partner (each will serve five years in prison).
The infinite game version is one in which each partner plans to continue his partnership with the other, and

if this relationship should end, it will be a surprise to both, as both will be worse off. Each, therefore is
confident the other won't fink, and in the infinite game Nash equilibrium, both cooperate (each will spend
one year in prison--as opposed to five, in the finite game).
IT encourages an infinite horizon, by enabling an organizational memory that transcends individuals'
tenures with individual firms. Firms' reputations are maintained in the corporate memory. Thus, firms have
an incentive to cooperate, in that trading partners will know their past behavior--i.e., do they cooperate or
fink? IT also enables mutual monitoring of performance, so for instance, shirking (i.e., finking) can more
surely and more quickly be punished. Payoffs may also be calculated more expediently, enabling more
transparent strategy sets.
Cooperation and communication enhance industry innovativeness, in that they enable and expedite the
interorganizational initiation, adoption, adaptation, acceptance, use and incorporation of information assets.
Cooperation and communication also enable the development of, and standardization to, communication
and measurement standards.

Measurement Precision
Mutual monitoring is further IT-enabled by measurement precision. Precise measurements allow actual
performance to be measured, compared against expected or promised performance, and recorded in
organization memory. This lessens the risk of opportunism by a trading partner, and thus improves the
efficiency of inter-organizational incentive systems in the creation, diffusion and management of
information assets.
Measurement precision enhances the creation of information assets, by enabling accurate monitoring and
comparison of experimental feedback. It thus diminishes causal ambiguity, decreasing "information
stickiness", knowledge tacitness or idiosyncracy to the extent that measurement systems provide precise,
objective, universally understandable metrics with which to communicate.
Shapiro stressed the importance of universally comparable metrics in ". . . contrasting facility, process and
product sustaining costs among the plants" (1995:11) in the application of activity-based costing methods
to optimize such supply value chain decisions as "Which products, at what levels, should be manufactured
at what facilities, using which resources and processes, to minimize total supply chain cost, or maximize
supply chain net revenues over medium and long term planning horizons?" (1995:4)
Agency problems are also reduced to the extent that measurement precision lessens causal ambiguity, and
to the extent that incentive systems aligned with partnership goal structures cause participants to view the
partnership as an infinite game when each participant's payoff is maximized in the partnership. Thus each
believes the relationship won't be unilaterally ended--i.e., the partners won't "fink." "One executive's
statement sums it up: 'Why do I think it will last? Because we both have something to gain' " (Henderson,
1990: 10).
Measurement precision thus enhances innovativeness by providing the means for firms and individuals to
better measure, record, compare and communicate experimental results. Measurement precision also
enhances communication & cooperation as it provides the means for firms to communicate experimental
results and aligns incentive systems to make firms more willing to cooperate in the creation and diffusion
of information assets.

Conclusion Industries differ in the rate with which information assets are created, diffused and managed
among constituent firms, i.e. in their rate of industrial learning. More optimal incentive systems and dense
communication linkages will enhance innovativeness, communication, cooperation and measurement
precision, four dimensions theoretically comprising "industrial learning". How effectively individual firms
within an industry contribute to, and use, industrial learning depends upon the complementarity of their
resources with those of the industry. This complementarity is enhanced by IT.
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